"Whose data is it anyway?" The implications of putting small area-level health and social data online by Exeter, Daniel John et al.
                          Exeter, D. J., Rodgers, S., & Sabel, C. E. (2013). "Whose data is it anyway?"
The implications of putting small area-level health and social data online.
Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands), 114.
10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.07.012
Link to published version (if available):
10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.07.012
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
Please cite this article in press as: Exeter DJ, et al. “Whose data is it anyway?” The implications of putting small area-level
health and social data online. Health Policy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.07.012
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelHEAP-3081; No. of Pages 9
Health Policy xxx (2013) xxx– xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Health  Policy
journa l h om epa ge: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /hea l thpol
“Whose  data  is  it  anyway?”  The  implications  of  putting  small
area-level  health  and  social  data  online
Daniel  John  Exetera,∗, Sarah  Rodgersb,1, Clive  Eric  Sabelc,d,2
a School of Population Health, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Wellesley Street, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
b Centre for Health Information Research and Evaluation, Swansea University, Singleton Park SA2 9PP, United Kingdom
c Department of Geography, College of Life & Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4
4RJ,  United Kingdom
d European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter Medical School, Knowledge Spa, Royal Cornwall Hospital,
Truro TR1 3HD, United Kingdom
a  r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
Article history:
Received 31 May  2012
Received in revised form 23 May  2013
Accepted 15 July 2013
Keywords:
Web  2.0
Privacy
Medical record linkage
Access
Data collection
Conﬁdentiality
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Data  from  electronic  patient  management  systems,  routine  national  health  databases,  and
social  administrative  systems  have  increased  signiﬁcantly  over  the  past  decade.  These
data are  increasingly  used  to  create  maps  and  analyses  communicating  the  geography  of
health  and  illness.  The  results  of  these  analyses  can  be  easily  disseminated  on  the  web
often without  due  consideration  for the  identiﬁcation,  access,  ethics,  or  governance,  of
these  potentially  sensitive  data. Lack  of  consideration  is  currently  proving  a deterrent  to
many  organisations  that  might  otherwise  provide  data  to  central  repositories  for invaluable
social  science  and  medical  research.  We  believe  that exploitation  of  such  data  is  needed  to
further  our  understanding  of  the  determinants  of  health  and inequalities.  Therefore,  we
propose a  geographical  privacy-access  continuum  framework,  which  could  guide  data  cus-
todians  in  the  efﬁcient  dissemination  of  data  while  retaining  the  conﬁdentiality  of the
patients/individuals  concerned.  We  conclude  that  a balance  of  restriction  and  access  is
needed allowing  linkage  of multiple  datasets  without  disclosure,  enabling  researchers  to
gather  the necessary  evidence  supporting  policy  changes  or complex  environmental  and
behavioural health  interventions.
© 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Developments in the secure management of large
routine health and demographic datasets and efforts to
democratise data availability [1] over the past decade
have led to their increased use by policy analysts, aca-
demics, and NGOs. Many studies continue to use such data
for cross-sectional analyses [2–15], however there is a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +64 9 923 4400; fax: +64 9 373 7503.
E-mail address: d.exeter@auckland.ac.nz (D.J. Exeter).
1 Tel.: +44 01792 602308; fax: +44 1792 513430.
2 Tel.: +44 01392 722297; fax: +44 01392 723342.
growing recognition among the academic community
that the strength of routine data is the ability to create
‘cohorts’ by linking records from multiple health and social
datasets to better examine an individual’s interaction
with the health system and its association with particular
outcomes [16–20]. Given the signiﬁcant improvements in
geographic referencing (the process of converting street
addresses or postcodes/zip codes to map  coordinates) of
health events, it is not surprising that a large proportion
of database-derived cohorts are interested in the geog-
raphy of health. One example is the Secure Anonymised
Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank [21], which uses
probabilistic linkage to construct a cohort comprising
the health trajectories of over 2 million Welsh residents.
0168-8510/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The SAIL databank is being used to examine variations in
health service costs and the association between health
and the built environment [22,23].
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) provides sub-
stantial support for the management and availability of
(spatial) data. GIS have undergone considerable changes
over the past decade with commercial GIS packages
progressing from standalone software packages to the
development of GIS applications for desktop, server,
web and mobile GIS, not to mention the inclusion
of Cloud Computing [24]. Similar developments have
been observed in the development of Open Source GIS.
As Evans and Sabel [25] have demonstrated, extensive
spatial analytical functionality can now be incorpo-
rated to webGIS. For example, MySQL and PostgreSQL,
(coupled with PostGIS) are two popular open source
database management systems (DBMS) widely used for
GIS applications These DBMS may  be integrated with the
MapServer (http://www.mapserver.org) and GeoServer
(http://www.geoserver.org) packages to provide open
source WebGIS, with limited functionality. Major multi-
national corporations interested in the management of
(spatially enabled) data, such as Google Inc. are now lever-
aging these developments via inter-linked databases and
(mapping) products to provide tools to users over the web
to be able to query and explore data.
The plethora of health and social data and tools
to analyse them now becoming available on the web,
combined with both a Web  2.0 savvy generation and
an increasing workforce of non-geographically trained
‘experts’ in WebGIS has led to a further development
in the visualisation of these data over the web. Use of
‘mash-ups’ of spatially enabled data from a variety of
sources, raises a concern that one can use the additive
power of datasets to infer results more revealing than
the individual datasets allow. At present, the transmis-
sion of health data over the Internet varies immensely
by geographical region, geographic scale, in the method
of delivery and extent of user interaction. For exam-
ple, users interested in the global variations in life
expectancy might extract tables from the United Nations
for analyses not online. Indeed, data downloaded from the
United Nations, World Bank and World Health Organi-
sation were used in the production of the WorldMapper
online atlas (http://www.worldmapper.org). Alternatively,
users interested in regional health variations may  be
attracted to the NHS atlas of healthcare variation, available
at http://www.sepho.org.uk/extras/maps/NHSatlas2011/
atlas.html. Here, users choose a topic of interest and
the InstantAtlas software presents a regional map
of England, linked to a histogram that outlines the
region’s performance (Fig. 1). At the other extreme,
users visiting the US National Cancer Institute’s web-
site (http://ratecalc.cancer.gov/) select a speciﬁc type
of cancer and the strata to produce a map  at their
chosen geographical scale. The user can export these
maps as an image and also drill down to extract fur-
ther information regarding cancers at the county level.
Glover and Jenkins [26] used a similar but Flash-based
webGIS to enable community mapping in Australia,
that allowed community members to upload and map
their own (health) datasets to share, entrusting the
administration and maintenance of their ‘projects’ to a
third party.
Glover and Jenkins’ webGIS is an example of the dual-
use dilemma that confronts users of health and social data
on the Internet. In the life sciences, the dual-use dilemma
refers to instances where the same scientiﬁc work can have
a beneﬁcial or hazardous use – the dilemma being the
inability to prevent the misuse without foregoing the ben-
eﬁcial uses [27]. While DNA synthesis, for example, may
have numerous potential beneﬁts, there is potential for this
technology to be used for bioterrorism. We  contend that
there is also a dual-use dilemma with respect to the prolif-
eration of health and social data: On the one hand, for the
beneﬁt of society and speciﬁcally advancements in medical
understanding, publically funded data should be dissemi-
nated widely. On the other hand, some of these data are
potentially sensitive and should be carefully managed.
In this paper, we  discuss some of the opportunities
and concerns associated with making available poten-
tially sensitive data and outline a proposed spatial-privacy
framework to guide researchers. First we outline concerns
over ‘Big Data’ before describing the beneﬁts that may  be
achieved through the use of high resolution spatial data. In
doing so, we consider why  health and social data should be
released and to whom. We  conclude by proposing a frame-
work for the efﬁcient use of health and spatial data whilst
preventing misuse, in response to the concerns and issues
that we raise throughout the paper.
2. What are the concerns?
In the digital era, there is growing concern that poten-
tially identiﬁable information is increasingly available
without an individual’s consent. Real concerns centre
around so called ‘mash-ups’ of data – combination of mul-
tiple data sources independent of each other, but which
together could potentially reveal more as a whole than the
sum of the individual parts. With smart-phone technology
increasingly widely used, so called ‘Big-Data’ is available at
our ﬁnger-tips. There is now the potential to electronically
track in space and time a user either covertly [28] or overtly,
for example when users manually enable geo-tagging in
Twitter.
Civilian access to more accurate geospatial digital data
from Global Positioning System (GPS), coupled with digital
imagery was  pivotal in the development of Google’s “Street
View” product. Although undoubtedly a commercial prod-
uct, one could reasonably argue that Google are providing
‘Street View’ in good faith, allowing users to familiarise
themselves with a destination they are locating. Despite
Google’s capture of geo-coded photos from public spaces
however, privacy advocates have objected to the ‘Street
View’ service as some images reveal individuals in com-
promising circumstances, such as patients leaving abortion
clinics, individuals climbing residential security gates, and
other lewd behaviour. Thus, care must be taken when sen-
sitive information accompanies location data [29].
Such concerns do vary from country to country, how-
ever. Socially conservative countries such as the USA
appear to be at one end of the (protectionist) spectrum,
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Fig. 1. Screen shot of the NHS Atlas of Healthcare Variation, with a region selected demonstrating brushing and linking functionality.
with perhaps Scandinavian countries at the other. In
Scandinavia, it is possible, for example, to legally obtain
detailed tax records for individuals if a social security
number is known [30]. There is an underlying philosophy
in Scandinavian countries (e.g. [31]) that information
gathered with public funds should be made available for
the beneﬁt of society, subject to appropriate safeguards.
Contrast that with recent debate in anglophile countries
where the trend is moving to ever tighter protectionism,
but note in the UK the debate opening out as British PM
David Cameron articulates his ‘Big Society’ concept – a
concept that places wider society at least on a par with
narrower individual self-interest [1].
Consider the nature of the data contained within
electronic medical records (EMRs), which has evolved
extensively over the past decade [32–35], to provide accu-
rate socio-demographic and clinical information, across the
health system with relative ease. From a patient’s perspec-
tive, conﬁdentiality is paramount in the patient–provider
relationship, and a threat to this relationship may  restrict
their willingness to reveal information that is crucial for
a correct diagnosis [36]. A recent study in New Zealand
interviewed 203 patients concerning their perceived
attitudes to EMRs and asked about their willingness to
share information with four different types of EMR  user:
health professional; health administrator; researchers;
and ‘other’. As expected, respondents were signiﬁcantly
more likely to share non-identiﬁable information and that
the type of EMR users inﬂuenced the responses. Over 70%
of respondents would consider release of information to
health professionals, this reduced substantially to about
40% for release of information to the research community.
When data were identiﬁable however, patients were
more conservative, with approximately 50% and less than
20% of patients likely to allow health professionals and
researchers access to their records, respectively [37].
3. Why  should data be released?
The data social scientists use for their research, whether
obtained from small surveys or from large national
datasets, are expensive to collect. Given that these data
are often funded from the public purse, there is a strong
argument that these datasets should be made avail-
able for analysis by other researchers for the beneﬁt of
society. Especially when we consider that the amount
of data obtained can far exceed the research questions
for which results can be published. The UK, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand provide data repositories for
the archival of health and social data. Indeed, the UK
Data Archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk) was estab-
lished in 1967 and continues to provide a valuable service
designed to encourage scientiﬁc enquiry and debate. A
report by the UKDA [38] outlines the many beneﬁts of
having a resource that include: maximising transparency
of research; enabling new collaborations; minimising
the duplication of data collection; and responding to
the increasing demands by some journals that data be
deposited for use by the wider scientiﬁc community. Given
the continued reduction of research funds available for
population health research, there is a strong argument for
supporting such a resource.
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There has been signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment in a
number of longitudinal studies, such as the Longitudinal
Study of England and Wales (e.g. [39]), the Scottish Longi-
tudinal Study [40] and the Millennium Birth Cohort [41],
yet access to these remains relatively difﬁcult. This raises
the question of whether the investment to creating expen-
sive studies such as these is worthwhile, if access to the
data is so restricted that they are effectively unusable. Con-
versely, allowing researchers to more easily access these
data would surely help understand the impact that deter-
minants have on various health outcomes.
4. Why  individual level data are needed
Environment, social and individual factors all have a role
to play in an individual’s health and wellbeing [42,43]. Link-
ing social and health data to a particular place is important
because where we live can and does inﬂuence our health.
Health outcomes are related to an individuals’ physical and
social environment, including factors such as water, soil
and air content, exposure to hazardous materials, tobacco
smoke, occupation, marital status, social support, charac-
teristics of the home, in addition to the composition of the
local built environment [44,45].
Spatial epidemiologists employ a powerful suite of
analytical methods in search of explanations of how
the environment affects people’s health and disease risk
[46,47]. To conduct this research in practice, disease cases
for individuals are often required; these are often located
in space by researchers using the residential address of the
person. The availability of an address, or proxy coordinates,
enable the most powerful spatial analyses, potentially pro-
viding new insights into disease aetiology [46,48,49]. The
distance over which some environmental factors are inﬂu-
ential are understood to be small, in the order of less than
400 m [50]. This implies that any (partial) suppression of
geographic location would render the data inadequate for
purpose and the results less useful than might otherwise
be possible. Naturally, results obtained from these analy-
ses should never be published at the individual level, but
rather should either be suitably aggregated, either spatially
or statistically, or appropriately masked [51].
Disease cases aggregated into small areas may  allow
spatial patterns closer to those in reality to emerge, how-
ever the potential for individuals to be identiﬁed is also
increased [52,53], so area units are often disproportion-
ately larger in rural areas partly to prevent identiﬁcation
of individuals in sparsely populated areas [54]. The aggre-
gation of health data into different sized spatial units, and
indeed different zone conﬁgurations at the same spatial
resolution, (the so-called Modiﬁable Areal Unit Problem)
[55,56] also introduces errors in which the observed rela-
tionship between disease outcomes and exposures may
vary immensely. Aggregated data mapped “on the ﬂy”
may  contain errors, including large variance, and should
be interpreted with caution. Prevalence calculations ratio-
nalise the number of disease cases by the number of people
at risk of having the disease per area, therefore generally
restricting users to pre-deﬁned census areas with popu-
lation estimates. In another branch of health geography,
health service researchers are interested in the supply of
health facilities as determined by a maximum distance
from the facility to homes. Many calculations of popula-
tion demand per facility use (road) network-based distance
measurements and represent individuals using (census)
area centroids because of their compliance with patient
privacy law [57].
Research has often relied on cross-sectional studies
using data captured at a single point in time, however lon-
gitudinal and intervention studies with a time series of
environmental exposures and health events are required
to infer causal relationships [58,59]. A sequence of health
events associated with changing residential exposure is
often the highest spatio-temporal resolution data avail-
able for individuals, [60] although availability of such data
is limited. Such analyses often rely upon databases sup-
ported by national population and residential registers,
with the Scandinavian countries notably leading the world
in this regard. An example of the type of longitudinal
residential exposure analysis that these registers allow
is the work by Sabel et al. exploring potential environ-
mental or genetic explanations of ALS in Finland, which
revealed place of birth effects with important implica-
tions for disease causation, which otherwise would remain
hidden [61,62]. Advances in spatial analytical techniques
have followed technological advances and now special-
ist software designed to analyse these complex data are
available, including SatScan for spatio-temporal cluster
detection [63], SpaceStat (http://www.biomedware.com),
for exploratory spatial data analysis; spatial econometric
analyses, and GeoDa [64] for descriptive spatial data anal-
ysis, such as spatial autocorrelation statistics, in addition
to basic spatial regression functionality and a number of
geovisualisation techniques. In addition the “R” statisti-
cal software (http://www.r-project.org/) has an extensive
library of open source packages that enable the analysis and
visualisation of spatial data. Therefore, demand for access
to longitudinal individual level health data with residen-
tial based locations by researchers is high, for example, to
explore spatio-temporal patterns aiming to improve our
understanding of disease causality.
5. Who  should have access to these data: legal
aspects of having access to individual level data
Geoprivacy is concerned with the privacy and conﬁ-
dentiality of geographic data and is particularly important
in health research. Health data collected with point geo-
references are increasingly unavailable to researchers
because laws (in the UK and the US, for example) pro-
tect sensitive information held for individuals [65,66].
Restrictions preserving privacy are often placed by the
data collection organisation at the time of data collec-
tion, either before release to researchers or online into
the public domain. The information that is most often the
ﬁrst to be subjected to suppression is geographic location;
knowledge of an individual’s address will almost certainly
disclose their identity. Often, address information for an
individual will be aggregated into a local small area unit,
for which population estimates are available. Nevertheless,
research has shown that, if desired, reverse-geocoding can
in some cases be used to identify unique addresses [67],
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alternatively the use of non-geographic attributes used in
combination may  be used for identiﬁcation of individuals,
especially if the level of aggregation is too small [68]. A
balance is needed – it may  be possible to release data at
a higher spatial resolution if fewer proxy identiﬁers such
as age, gender or occupation, accompany the data. Dif-
ferent levels of data privacy may  be released to trusted
researchers in comparison to that released online into the
public domain.
The organisation providing data (data custodian) may
place restrictions on data usage by a researcher to only
answer the speciﬁc research question(s) using the meth-
ods outlined in the data request and/or ethics application.
In general, the more sensitive the data, the greater will
be the number of conditions of use imposed by ethical
review and the data custodian. For example, diseases such
as tick-transmitted human babesiosis may  have individual
level address data released on the understanding the data
are password protected and will only be used by speciﬁed
researchers for the submitted purpose [69]. However, the
release of individual-level data for more sensitive health
conditions is unlikely to be released to researchers. This
is likely the case for particular groups of population; dis-
ease cases for children and other vulnerable groups will be
released more cautiously, if at all. These restrictions are
likely to create omissions in the research completed for
those groups for whom research could be most beneﬁcial.
While some data custodians may  be reluctant to share
their data initially, there is certainly a need to establish a
trusted custodian-user relationship. By developing proto-
cols that ensure the data are managed (by both parties)
in an ethical manner, systems can be created to facilitate
a trustworthy working relationship. This then removes the
“onus” from an individual researcher to a system built with
information governance in mind. In these cases, submitting
the work to an information governance review commit-
tee prior to publication would be reassuring to both the
data provider and researcher. Although some epidemiolo-
gists have access to coordinates for individual disease cases
and could be viewed as privileged, there are obvious disclo-
sure pitfalls of this system compared to anonymised health
databanks, incorporating expert information governance
checks [21,70]. Researchers may  publish results believing
them to be anonymised and adhering to disclosure rules,
to ﬁnd later there is sufﬁcient material available either on
their maps, or the internet, to identify individuals [67,71].
Researchers from industry and academia in the UK
already have access to anonymised clinical and demo-
graphic data governed by the NHS, but other routine
datasets exist that are under-utilised. The CEO of the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Professor Paul
Boyle ([72], p.19) strongly believes that “[w]e need more
active engagement with the public – a ‘social contract’ based
on an informed understanding of research beneﬁts. . . We
have to explain how data are reliable, valuable, and can be
properly managed. [and the] failure to make better use of
routinely collected public data can be argued to be a crimi-
nal waste of public resources” and we strongly support this
perspective. The extent to which health data should be
available to researchers or the general public is currently
the subject of wider societal debate. The European Union is
currently considering revisions to its data protection guide-
lines, and researchers in Europe are concerned that the
revisions would restrict access to individual-level data cur-
rently used in medical research. Similarly, David Cameron,
the UK Prime Minister, proposed a number of changes for
NHS-maintained data access. Of particular relevance was
his vision to ensure that all patient data would be included
in clinical research, although patients could opt-out if they
chose [73].
6. A framework for providing access to spatial
health and social data
Here, we suggest that access to health and social data
could be determined by the degree to which individuals
may  be identiﬁed and the potential beneﬁt of analysis
of such data, and propose a privacy-access continuum
framework (Fig. 2) drawing on our collective experiences
working with geographic health data in different countries.
Within this framework, the level of anonymity would spec-
ify the potential levels of access for the different types of
end-users. Consider electronic medical records for exam-
ple, and assume that individuals have a unique patient
identiﬁcation code (PIC). This may  be the National Health
Service number in the UK, Social Security number in the US,
or the National Health Indicator in New Zealand. Typically,
the PIC and key demographic characteristics of an indi-
vidual are associated with each unique contact a patient
has with the health system: visiting the GP, medicines
dispensed, blood tests at a community laboratory and pro-
cedures in hospital. These routine datasets would have a
range of end-users, including clinicians, researchers, pol-
icy analysts and the public. With regard to levels of access,
one would reasonably expect the clinician to have the
most access, in order to offer the best treatment regime
to a patient. In this instance, all of the patient’s data is
‘live’ – including their PIC, demographics, and past medi-
cal history. Depending on the research question of interest,
researchers and policy analysts would require data from
one or more routine databases. Under these circumstances,
the data released may  be for individuals following the
removal of ‘live’ PICs. Requests from researchers and ana-
lysts would require careful consideration of the level of
geographical identiﬁers released and providers could use
the disclosure rules endorsed by their national statistics
department for guidance. Often, the questions asked by
the public are answered using aggregate data, such as
prevalence and incidence rates, stratiﬁed by age, gender,
and/or geographical areas. However, one would recom-
mend considering disclosure rules again, ensuring small
numbers do not increase the risk of identiﬁcation.
A further example of the privacy-access continuum
(Fig. 2) relates to the use of residential address data
for geographical analyses. Using residential data provides
opportunities to understand the aetiology of diseases, as
individuals can be identiﬁed in relation to speciﬁc expo-
sures. Small areas may  be used for spatial analyses, so
individuals are “lost in the crowd”, but when used with data
for other key determinants (e.g. age, occupation) these data
once again have the ability to identify individuals. The use
of a full UK postcode (Unit postcode), containing an average
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Fig. 2. The privacy-access continuum framework.
of 16 homes, will nearly always make individual records
identiﬁable. This is particularly a problem with rare dis-
eases because individuals will be likely to be unique within
small areas. Large area aggregation is less likely to enable
identiﬁcation of individuals, but the ability to perform anal-
yses that usefully identify environment or social causes of
disease reduces signiﬁcantly. Ideally, researchers will use
anonymised systems to reduce disclosure risk. Thus, any
raw health or social data entering the public realm would
be checked to ensure they comply with information gov-
ernance. However, this should not be at the expense of
research that may  beneﬁt society by reducing the burden
of ill-health, particularly to disadvantaged groups.
When considering the privacy-access continuum for
large health datasets, at one extreme are anonymised data-
banks. Databanks require a large initial investment but
continue to make large strides forward assessing public
health using anonymous individual-level data. Although
the data can be made available to researchers, mecha-
nisms put in place to maintain privacy standards are time
consuming to implement. Indeed, the anonymisation pro-
cedure is likely to render certain types of high resolution
spatial analyses intractable. Therefore, a balance must be
struck between access and privacy.
There is an increasing trend for some custodians of
national surveys to provide users the opportunity to access
‘microdata’ [74–76]. In the UK, for example, the academic
community have access to a 1% sample of anonymised
records from the 1991 and 2001 censuses. Data security
initiatives, such as ensuring an individual is ‘present’ in
only one of the many different tables available, minimises
the risk of identiﬁcation. Furthermore, geographic analyses
can only be conducted at the Local Government Area scale.
While some NZ microdata can be accessed on CD-ROM,
(subject to approval) [74] the more common approach is
to allow users to conduct analyses at a secure location (i.e.
at the Statistics Ofﬁce, on a dedicated machine). Users are
therefore are able to exploit the beneﬁts of individual data,
and their spatial attributes, BUT only the results from the
analyses are removed from the secure data laboratories.
Some organisations now have systems in place to allow
researchers remote access to project-speciﬁc data [70].
At the other extreme are the population registers main-
tained in Scandinavian countries. By maintaining a near
real-time longitudinal population register, with the ability
to link to other registers such as births and deaths, housing,
buildings and tax registers [30], these data provide numer-
ous exciting research possibilities subject to appropriate
ethical approval procedures. It is interesting to speculate
about the future of national population registers elsewhere
with debate raging over the decline of decennial population
censuses in the United Kingdom.
7. Linkage – and putting a system of checks in place:
Secure microdata facilities and anonymised databanks
employ data linkage mechanisms and these serve not only
to maintain privacy but also link disparate silos of health
data that would not ordinarily be associated. The combi-
nation of different data types, for example, social care and
health data, is made possible using anonymous linkages
that maintain privacy of individuals. Incoming data (such
as quarterly updates of hospitalisation) may  be joined to
data already in the system for a particular individual even
though the identity of that person is unknown. Many data
providers would be less likely to provide such enriched
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social and health data for research unless a trusted sys-
tem was in place to assure that privacy was maintained
and that the researcher has a good reputation in handling
these complex datasets. Some organisations maintaining
databanks physically house the data in one location [21,70]
whereas others maintain data with the providers (e.g.
Ofﬁce of National Statistics, Police, Social Development)
and have a mechanism for combining data tailored to a
particular research question [77,78]. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to design or detail the technical mechanisms
to implement this framework, however, there are many
papers which do so (see for example, Ford et al. [70]).
One of the many beneﬁts of data linkage systems is
their ability to conduct more complete longitudinal stud-
ies for a reduced cost [23]. Aggregated data could be
approved through information governance procedures and
subsequently placed online, however, raw data and com-
plete analysis including results should be kept on a secure
server, thereby providing a data release prevention mech-
anism to reassure data providers. Under this model, the
researcher should only be allowed to download/receive
the aggregated results, either in the form of data for
large administrative units, tables, ﬁgures and summaries
of statistical procedures. Performing the quality assurance
processes may  be time consuming and therefore delay the
publication of data online.
8. Conclusions
We  have reﬂected on the numerous opportunities that
the increasing availability of health and social data have
created, particularly with respect to the publication of spa-
tial health and social data on the Internet. We  argue that
there is a dual use dilemma in making these data available.
On the one hand, publically funded data should be dissem-
inated widely to beneﬁt society. On the other, there is a risk
that the release of such information can be used for detri-
mental purposes. To this end, we present a privacy-access
framework that proposes an opportunity to maximise the
possibilities to better understand the geography of health
while mitigating adverse effects of releasing individual-
level data. There is a plethora of research demonstrating
the value of spatial data in a population health context
[3,5,10,20,22,25,26,39,41,46,54,55,57,59,61–63,69,70], yet
the use of large, anonymised datasets is in its relative
infancy. While each data provider has policies (e.g. [70,77])
concerning the release of their datasets, we argue that there
is a need to develop guidelines with a view to standardising
data management policies. Therefore, our paper welcomes
a debate on both sides of the argument regarding access to
such datasets. Further conversations are required to negoti-
ate mechanisms that maximise societal beneﬁt from access
to data while simultaneously preserving the conﬁdentiality
of individuals.
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